Sunday, June 25, 2017

Monday in Washington, June 26, 2017

INDIA AND THE U.S.: PARTNERS IN INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMICS. 6/26, 11:30am-1:30pm. Sponsor: Hudson, Confederation of Indian Industry. Speakers: Representative George Holding, U.S. Representative; Pratyush Kumar, President, Boeing India, Vice President, Boeing International; Danny O’Brien, Government Relations Leader, GE; James Shapiro, Resident Director, Tata Sons; Am. Husain Happqani, Senior Fellow, Director for South and Central Asia, Hudson.

RISING CHINESE FDI IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. 6/26, 12:30-2:00pm. Sponsors: Atlantic Council; OECD. Speakers: Fred Kempe, President, CEO, Atlantic Council; Gerardo Mato, Chairman, Global Banking & Markets – Americas, HSBC; Sérgio Amaral, Ambassador of Brazil to United States; Jason Marczak, Director, Latin America Economic Growth Initiative, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council; Angel Melguizo, Head, Latin American and Caribbean Unit, OECD; Claire Reade, Former Assistant, USTR, China, Senior Counsel, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. Moderator: Shawn Donnan, World Trade Editor, Financial Times.

PROMOTING RESILIENCE AND CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATION FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE. 6/26, 1:30-7:00pm. Sponsor: U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Speakers: Albert Cho, Vice President, Strategy and Business Development, Xylem Inc.; Josh Sawislak, Global Director, Resilience, AECOM; Jim Bruce, Senior Vice President, Corporate Public Affairs, UPS; Atyia Martin, Chief Resilience Officer, Boston; Ed Mortimer, Executive Director, Transportation Infrastructure, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Tamara Casey, Chief Technology Officer, Ligado Networks; Matt Gannon, Head of Federal Affairs, Farmers Insurance.

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NORTH KOREA'S NUKES AND BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABILITY. 6/26, 1:30-4:30pm. Sponsor: Institute for Corean-American Studies. Speakers: Scott Bray, National Intelligence Manager for East Asia, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and others TBA.


DILEMMAS OF A TRADING NATION: JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVOLVING ASIA-PACIFIC ORDER. 6/26, 2:00-3:30pm. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: author Mireya Solis, Senior Fellow, Chair, Japan Studies, Brookings; Wendy Cutler, Vice President, Managing Director, Asia Society Policy Institute; Moderator: Richard C. Bush, Senior Fellow, Chair, Taiwan Studies, Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings.

THE KOREAN WAR REMEMBERED. 6/26, 2:00-3:00pm. Sponsor: History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center. Speakers: Charles Kraus, Program Lead, History and Public Policy Program; Samuel Wells, Cold War Fellow, Wilson Center, Former Associate Director, Woodrow Wilson Center; Michael Devine, Public Policy Fellow, Wilson Center, Adjunct Professor, History, University of Wyoming.

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LAUNCH OF INDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA/AMERICA MATTERS FOR INDIA. 6/26, 4:00-5:30pm. Sponsor: East West Center in Washington. Speakers; Dr. Satu Limaye, Director, East-West Center in Washington; Sangita Reddy, FICCI's National Head of Healthcare Committee; Kapil Sharma, VP for Government and Public Affairs, North America, Wipro; Adrian Mutton,Founder & CEO, Sannam S4; Representative from Microsoft; Representative from Mahindra; Representative George Holding, (R-NC), Co-Chair, House India Caucus; Representative Ami Bera, (D-CA); Ridhika Batra, Director, FICCI-USA; Dr. Vijay Chauthaiwale (Ret.), Member of Atal Mission for Innovation, Government of India; Richard M. Rossow, Senior Adviser & Wadhwani Chair in US-India Policy Studies, CSIS; Representative Tulsi Gabbard, (D-HI).
FOREIGN SERVICE: FIVE DECADES ON THE FRONTLINES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. 6/26, 5:30-7:30pm. Sponsor: Brookings. Speaker: Author James Dobbins, Senior Fellow, Distinguished Chair, Diplomacy and Security, RAND Corporation. Moderator: Peter Baker, Chief White House Correspondent, New York Times.

Wednesday, June 21, 2017

Tracing the decline of a beautiful Japan

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By Michael Hoffman, author of In the Land of the Kami: A Journey into the Hearts of Japan and Other Worlds

THE JAPAN TIMES, June 17, 2017

Two irreconcilable views of patriotism were given their classic expressions by two Englishmen: Lord Byron, the poet (1788-1824), and Dr. Johnson, the lexicographer and jack-of-all-literary-trades (1709-84). Byron said, “He who loves not his country can love nothing.” And Johnson: “Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.”

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s patriotism is unabashed and fervent. He is doing all in his very considerable power to transmit it, via education, to the nation at large. His first stint as prime minister produced a revision to the Fundamental Law of Education in 2006 that charges schools with cultivating in children “an attitude that respects tradition and culture, and loves the nation and homeland that have fostered them.” He vowed at the time to “push ahead with education rebuilding that will … nurture people with vision and hope and build a dignified and beautiful country.”

Japan’s beauty was beautifully sung by the country’s most ancient poets, those of the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries whose work was anthologized in the famous Manyoshu collection, dating to the latter half of the eighth century. Among the poets were emperors and subjects, courtiers and lowly soldiers, men and women. Their shared love for their country at times seems almost erotic. The very mountains love one another: “Mount Kagu strove with Mount Miminashi/ for the love of Mount Unebi.” And in any human love, the nation seems ever present, a silent but indispensable third party: “On the vast lake of Omi/ you boatmen that come rowing/ close by the shore,/ ply not too hard your oars …/ lest you should startle into flight/ the birds beloved of my dear husband!” So sang Empress Yamato-hime, consort of Emperor Tenji (reigned 661-71).

As the Manyoshu era faded, so did patriotism. Warriors supplanted aristocrats, military rule marginalized the Imperial house, and Japan itself, beginning in the late 12th century, crumbled into a chaos of warring feudal domains. Poetry persisted, but the self-sacrificing loyalty it celebrated was to one’s domain, one’s lord — not one’s country. There was no country.

Unification in 1600 under the Tokugawa Shogunate produced no upsurge of national pride. The official morality it enforced was Confucian — hardly a native plant. Modern Japanese patriotism is rooted in simmering opposition to Confucianism, tainted by its very foreignness, and to the shoguns, damnable as usurpers. (Buddhism, then in eclipse, scarcely counted.) Japan had an indigenous religion: Shinto, the “way of the gods.” And it had its rightful ruler: the sacred Emperor, descended from the Sun Goddess. Where were they? Shinto was nowhere, all but forgotten. The Emperor languished in dignified but impotent exile in Kyoto, the old capital.

Vanguard teacher of generations of patriots to come was Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801). Did he know what he would spawn, this most gentle and erudite of scholars? Among his intellectual progeny were the kamikaze pilots of World War II, who drew inspiration from his famous poem: “What is the spirit of Yamato’s (Japan’s) ancient land?/ It is like the wild cherry blossoms,/ radiant in the sun.” The kamikaze poet who wrote on the eve of his suicide mission, “If only we might fall/ like cherry blossoms in spring —/ so pure and radiant!” was surely thinking of him.

“Our august country,” wrote Norinaga, “is the august country of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu Omikami. It is the beautiful and magnificent august country superior to all other countries, so people’s hearts and actions, as well as the words they speak, are straightforward and elegant. In the past, the realm was governed peacefully and without incident, so that, unlike in other countries, there was not the least trace of anything bothersome or troubling. But then writing came over from China.”

Thus were the seeds of corruption sown. Japan ceased to be fully Japanese. It became quasi-Chinese. Following the way of the Chinese sages, it lost the way of the Japanese gods. Of them Norinaga wrote: “All things in this world, such as the changing of the seasons, the falling of the rain and the gusting of the wind, as well as the various good and bad things that happen to countries and people, all are entirely the august works of the gods. Among the gods there are good ones and bad ones. … They cannot be understood with ordinary reason. … The fact that many things go against ordinary reason, such as good people meeting misfortune and bad people prospering, is all because of the deeds of these gods. In foreign countries, though, there is no correct transmission of the age of the gods, so they do not understand this.”

In short: A “beautiful and magnificent august country” is one thing; the happiness of people is something else altogether and, in fact, quite beside the point. The gods are the gods — there is no holding them to account. The people’s lot — the people’s joy, if only they know it — is to know the gods as best they can be known, and to serve them as best they can be served. For Norinaga’s disciples of the first two generations after his death, that meant “revere the Emperor and expel the barbarians” — a truculent challenge to the tottering shogunate which, having usurped Imperial rule, now stood helpless against the ever more boldly intruding Western “barbarians.”

Norinaga with his writing brush, his disciples with their swords, would gladly have thrust Japan back to its Manyoshu past, if only they could. They couldn’t, of course. The Meiji Era (1868-1912) that began with an Imperial Restoration modernized, industrialized, capitalized and militarized Japan far more than it “restored” it, if restoration means return to a pristine state. Norinaga’s ideal was the misty “land of the gods.” Meiji’s was “rich country, strong army.”

And Abe’s? He, perhaps no less than his Meiji predecessors, is remaking Japan — into a “dignified and beautiful country,” he says, vague as always as to what he means; hopefully not a neo-“land of the gods.” “Land of the gods” makes for pretty mythology but — as history teaches at such cost — very ugly politics.

Sunday, June 18, 2017

Monday in Washington, June 19, 2017

REDEFINING MANUFACTURING: THE SERVICE SECTOR’S ROLE IN BOOSTING US COMPETITIVENESS AND RESILIENCE. 6/19, 10:00-11:30am. Sponsor: Asia Program, Wilson Center. Speakers: Matthew Resiman, Director, International Trade, Microsoft; Trevor Gunn, Vice president, international Relations, Medtronic; Sherry Stephenson, Senior Fellow, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development; Christine Bliss, President, Coalition of Services Industries. Moderator: Meg Lundsager, Fellow, Public Policy, Wilson Center.

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THE FORGOTTEN FLIGHT: TERRORISM, DIPLOMACY AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE. 6/19, 11:00am-Noon. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: author Stuart H. Newberger, Wilson Council Member, Senior Partner, International Law Firm Crowell & Moring. Moderator: David Ottaway, Middle East Fellow, Wilson Center.

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL JOSEPH DUNFORD
. 6/19, 11:30-1:00pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: National Press Club. Speaker: U.S. Marine Corps General Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff.

PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: RELATIONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY CHALLENGES. 6/19, Noon-1:15pm, Lunch. Sponsor: Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: H.E. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, Ambassador to the United States, Pakistan; H.E. Dr. Hamdullah Mohib, Ambassador to the United States, Afghanistan. Moderator: Marvin Weinbaum, Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI.

LOSING AN ENEMY: CAN THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL SURVIVE TRUMP? 6/19, Noon, Lunch. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speaker: Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council. Moderator: Barbara Slavin, Acting Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council.

U.S.-INDIA DEFENSE AND SECURITY COOPERATION: PROMISE AND MOMENTUM. 6/19, 1:00-3:00pm. Sponsor: Wadhwani Chair, CSIS. Speakers: Amb. Hemant Krishan Singh, Director General, Delhi Policy Group; Lt. Gen. Anil Ahuja (Retd.), Former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group; Brig. Arun Sahgal (Retd.), Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group; Richard M. Rossow, Senior Adviser and Wadhwani Chair, U.S.-India Policy Studies, CSIS; Kathleen H. Hicks, Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, Director, International Security Program, CSIS.

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TOWARD A GLOBAL NORM AGAINST MANIPULATING THE INTEGRITY OF FINANCIAL DATA. 6/19, 2:00-3:30pm. Sponsor: Cyber Policy Initiative, Carnegie. Speakers: Siobhan MacDermott, Senior Vice President, Executive, Global Cyber Public Policy, Bank of America; Greg Rattray, Director, Global Cyber Partnerships & Government Strategy, JP Morgan Chase & Co.; Tim Maurer, Fellow, Co-Director, Cyber Policy Initiative, Carnegie; Michael Chertoff, Co-Founder, Executive Chairman, Chertoff Group. Moderator: Duncan Hollis, Nonresident Scholar, Carnegie, James E. Beasley Professor, Law, Temple Law School.

DEAN ACHESON AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF POWER. 6/19, 2:00-3:30pm. Sponsor: History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center. Speakers: Author Michael F. Hopkins, Director, MA, Twentieth Century History Program, University of Liverpool; David Painter, Associate Professor, International History, Georgetown University. Moderator: Charles Kraus, Program Associate, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center.

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POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND TRUTHS IN THE TRUMP ERA. 6/19, 2:00-7:00pm. Sponsor: Hoover Institution. Speakers: Harvey Mansfield, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Professor, Government, Harvard University; Morris Fiorina, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; Professor, Political Science, Stanford University; James Ceaser, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Professor, Politics, University of Virginia; Spencer Abraham, Former U.S. Senator, U.S. Congress, Secretary, Energy, United States; Bill Kristol, Weekly Standard Editor at Large; Doug Sosnik, Political Strategist.

HOME FRONT TO BATTLEFRONT AN OHIO TEENAGER IN WWII. 6/19, 4:00pm. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics. Speaker: Author Ambassador Frank Lavin, CEO, Founder, Export Now, Former Ambassador to Singapore, Former Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade.

Japan's Official Statements of Apology are only four

What is an official Japanese government statement? What would make a Japanese apology official? The following paper answers this question by pointing out the three war apologies that have distinction of a Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) behind them. This is approval by Cabinet, which is the executive of the Japanese government. No war apology can be said to have been approved by the Diet, which would also be official.

The article below does not mention the fourth Cabinet Decision on a war apology. This was in 2009 to the American former POWs (buried in a February 6, 2009 reply, #171-22 [English, Question III, #3], to a Dietmember). Written answers to questions made in the Diet are kakugi ketteis. This apology by implication and vagueness included ALL POWs of Imperial Japan during WWII. It is the first war apology to a specific group.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in all his war statements has been very careful not to have them Cabinet approved. Neither his address to the joint meeting of the U.S. Congress or at Pearl Harbor were Cabinet approved. This substantially weakens them, and implies that the words are more personal than state sanctioned. There is then room for improvement.

The Prime Minister's Statements on Understanding of History

By Junichiro Shoji, director of NIDS Center for Military HistoryNational Institute for Defense Studies Commentary, 18 February 2013. Provisional translation by Asia Policy Point. [National Institute for Defense Studies is a policy research institute under Japan's Ministry of Defense]

Introduction 

In a speech to a plenary session of the Upper House, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that he "would like to make a future-oriented statement that is appropriate for the 21st century," while, as with his first cabinet, continuing to follow the tenor of the "Murayama Statement," indicating Abe's intention to issue a new "Abe Statement." Abe has referred a number of times to the idea of an "Abe Statement" up to now, but this was the first time he mentioned the possibility in the Diet.

In this article, I will focus on three "Prime Minister's Statements" addressing Japan's historical understanding that received cabinet approval in order to identify their respective particular features and differences among them (these statements being divided between those receiving cabinet approval and those not needing it).

1) Murayama Statement

The "Murayama Statement," officially entitled "On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End," was a statement issued by Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on 15 August 1995, 50 years after the end of the Second World War, regarding Japan's recognition of its wartime history. The following is an extract from the statement.
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. 
The primary special aspect of this statement is Murayama's expression of "deep remorse" and "heartfelt apology" in regards to the "tremendous damage and suffering" inflicted on Asian and other countries through Japan's "colonial rule and aggression." Moreover, based on this recognition, Murayama expressed his commitment to peace and the renunciation of war to ensure that Japan never repeats this sorrow of history again.

Up to then, official documents, statements, speeches, and so on had often expressed Japan's "remorse," "apology," and "renunciation of war," but [the Murayama Statement] compiled all of these sentiments into one statement, and was given the weighty imprimatur of cabinet approval [kakugi kettei, emphasis added]. For example, in his policy speech to the Diet on 23 August 1993, then Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa stated, "I would like to express anew our profound remorse and apologies for the fact that past Japanese actions, including aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people." Prime Minister Murayama himself in the "Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the 'Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative,'" issued in August 1994, expressed similar sentiments.

The second aspect is that for the first time a reference to "following a mistaken national policy" was included in the Murayama Statement. Since a clear recognition was made of a "mistaken national policy," an animated debate subsequently ensued about who the main bearers of responsibility were and what the specific target policies and their timing were.

At that time, there were various views in Japan on the matter. For example, since disputes had arisen regarding historical understanding, the Resolution To Renew the Commitment to Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned From History (War Renouncing Resolution) that was issued by the Lower House in June 1995 adopted the following mediating language: "Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world, and recognizing that Japan carried out such acts in the past, inflicting pain and suffering upon the peoples of other countries, especially in Asia, the Member s in this House express a sense of deep remorse."

That is, the words "aggression" and "apology" were replaced by "acts of aggression" and "deep remorse" respectively. A sentence calling for "transcending the differences over historical views of the past war" was also added. Moreover, although Diet resolutions are meant, in principle, to be passed unanimously, since many members from both the ruling and the opposition parties absented themselves during the voting, it was the rare case of a resolution being approved by less than half the total number of Diet members.

Although the Murayama statement was said, for external consumption, to have been led by the prime minister's office, in actuality, the statement was carefully vetted by the Foreign Ministry as part of its long-term processing of post-war policy. Moreover, the target countries for the resolution, particularly China, South Korea, the United States, and Britain, were kept well in mind, and letters from Murayama were sent to those four countries at the same time as the statement was released. (See The Murayama Statement and MOFA, by Ryuji Hattori.)

Accordingly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson lauded the statement, saying, "The Japanese government has expressed deep remorse over their past history of colonial rule and aggression, and they have shown a positive attitude in apologizing to the peoples of Asia."

After that, the Murayama Statement policy was adopted and followed by successive cabinets, including those of the Liberal Democratic Party, and the policy has continued until today.

2) Koizumi Statements

On 15 August 2005, then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi issued a statement marking the 60th anniversary of the Second World War's end. It basically followed the Murayama Statement, but Koizumi's statement was significant because it was issued by an LDP prime minister. It is certainly true that certain quarters in both China and South Korea were dissatisfied with the Murayama Statement because it was issued under a Socialist Party administration.

Koizumi's statement had the following characteristics. First, the references to the wartime period in the Murayama Statement, particularly those that sparked argument, such as "following a mistaken national policy," "ensnar[ing] the Japanese people in a fateful crisis," and "eliminat[ing] self-righteous nationalism," are gone, and in their place, much more prominence is given to emphasizing Japan's postwar history of peaceful development (achievements as a peace-loving nation). 

Thus, Koizumi's statement points out that postwar Japan adopted a completely pacifist position, and has contributed to peace and prosperity in the world (international contributions) through its Official Development Assistance (ODA), participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), and so on. The statement reads, "Japan's postwar history has indeed been six decades of manifesting its remorse on the war through actions." Koizumi's statement has a "new aspect not found in the Murayama Statement," and as shown by the path taken by Japan after the war, Japan's past remorse is expressed not only in words [but also by international contributions], and "by emphasizing that Japan's actual actions are proof of this, the statement is all the more persuasive" (Takakazu Kuriyama, Wakai [Reconciliation]).

Incidentally, in a BBC opinion survey in 2012, Japan was ranked as the top country for "having a positive influence on the world," and in a survey by an Australian think tank in 2012, Japan ranked 5th in a list of "peaceful countries."

On the other hand, in the history education and media in China and South Korea, compared with the Second World War and Japan's colonial rule, Japan's postwar course has not been taken up very much. The Japan-China History Research Committee (December 2006-December 2009), of which I was a member, addressed not only the wartime period but also ancient and modern history, including the postwar period. In that sense, it had epoch-making significance (although at the request of the Chinese side, the section in the committee's report dealing with postwar history was not publicly released). This committee was established based on an agreement with the Chinese side when Prime Minister Abe visited China in October 2006. The Chinese side "positively appreciated the fact that postwar Japan has consistently followed the path of a peaceful country based on freedom and democracy."

Second, based on postwar Japan's pacifism, Koizumi's statement declared, "I believe it is necessary to work hand in hand with other Asian countries, especially with China and the Republic of Korea, which are Japan's neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water, to maintain peace and pursue the development of the region." While specifically naming China and South Korea, the statement penultimately concluded, "I intend to build a future-oriented cooperative relationship based on mutual understanding and trust with Asian countries."

At the Asian-African Summit (Bandung Conference) held in Jakarta in April 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi gave a similar speech, following the line of the Murayama Statement, but it was the first time a Japanese prime minister had referred to the matter of historical awareness at an international conference and expressed "remorse" and "apologies," making the speech exceptional.

Third, Koizumi's statement begins: "...I affirm my determination that Japan must never again take the path to war, reflecting that the peace and prosperity we enjoy today are founded on the ultimate sacrifices of those who lost their lives for the war against the their will. More than three million compatriots died in the war -- in the battlefield thinking about their homeland and worrying about their families, while others perished amidst the destruction of war, or after the war in remote foreign countries." Referring to the Japanese war dead, the statement expresses a remembrance of the Japanese who died as a result of the war and a desire for peace. This is an expression of Koizumi's logic (thinking) for visiting Yasukuni Shrine.

Prime Minister Koizumi's first visit to Yasukuni after becoming prime minister came in August 2001; because of his consideration of China, Koizumi made the visit on the 13th, ahead of the anniversary on the 15th. On that day, Koizumi issued a statement that began: "...Japan caused tremendous sufferings to many people of the world, including its own people. Following a mistaken national policy during a certain period in the past, Japan imposed, through its colonial rule and aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering, particularly to the people of the neighboring countries in Asia. This has left a still incurable scar to many people in the region." This statement replaces the Murayama Statement's phrase "tremendous damage and suffering" with "immeasurable ravages and suffering." With the addition of the idea of an "incurable scar" and so on, Koizumi's statement was evaluated as going beyond the Murayama Statement. Although he continued to visit Yasukuni, Koizumi carried on the policy line of the Murayama Statement.

Moreover, when Koizumi visited China on 8 October, two months after his first Yasukuni visit, he went to the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (near Lugou Bridge), the first prime minister to do so since Murayama visited the Museum in 1995. "I looked at the various exhibits with a feeling of heartfelt apology and condolences for those Chinese people who were victims of aggression...We must look directly at our past history and must never cause a war again. Based on our remorse, Japan has been able to achieve prosperity as a peaceful country after the war," Koizumi said after he toured the museum. Koizumi expressed remorse and an apology more clearly than the Murayama Statement, which did not specify the other countries. The Chinese side highly appreciated Koizumi's remarks, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin said with surprise, "This is the first Japanese prime minister I can talk with to such an extent." Sources said that the Chinese side held expectations that Koizumi would not visit Yasukuni again (Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 July 2005). Thus, it has been pointed out that in response to Koizumi's subsequent repeated visits to Yasukuni, the main emphasis of China's criticism moved from the issue of historical understanding per se to the damage to the national sentiment of the suffering country.

3) Kan Statement


Prime Minister Naoto Kan issued a statement in August 2010, the 100th anniversary of the annexation of Korea. The statement referred only to South Korea, and it was the first statement issued by the Democratic Party of Japan.

Following the tenor of the Murayama Statement, Kan's statement made specific mention of Japan's colonial rule of Korea, and in reference to the March 1st independence movement [Samil Movement], the statement recognized the coerciveness of Japan's colonial rule: "...the Korean people of that time [were deprived of their country], and their ethnic pride was deeply scarred by the colonial rule, which was imposed against their will...." Expressing consideration for the sentiments of the South Korean people, the statement also said, "Those who render pain tend to forget it, while those who suffered cannot forget it easily."

On the other hand, around half of the statement, particularly the latter half, declares that Japan and South Korea should build future-oriented ties based on the 2,000 years of exchanges and friendship between the two countries, while also recognizing the sorrowful periods in the past. Thus the statement declares: "Japan and the Republic of Korea have become the most important and closest neighboring nations now in the 21st century, sharing such values as democracy, freedom, and a market economy." Referencing the idea of an East Asian community, the statement also stressed the necessity of building a "partnership where we cooperate and exercise leadership for the peace and prosperity of the region and the world."

Conclusion

As far as an Abe Statement, the specific timing and contents will be considered from now. Regarding the timing, it is said that, in accordance with custom, one option is the year 2015, which will mark the 70th year since the war's end. As regards the contents, Abe has stated, "We should issue a statement that is appropriate for one given 70 years after the war and which includes the postwar path taken by Japan and the path that should be taken from now." Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga has said, "We believe that a statement that is focused on a future-oriented outlook is necessary when we consider the stability, peace, and economies of Asia."

In other words, it is believed that the statement will aim for an "orientation towards the future," based on Japan's postwar course and not being solely tied to the past. It will likely reflect the transition, which I have taken up in this article, from the Murayama Statement, which took responsibility for Japan's wartime period, to the statements by Koizumi and Kan, which, while based on the sentiments of the Murayama Statement, also emphasized Japan's postwar path and future-oriented relations.

I had several opportunities to talk with scholars on the Chinese side through the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, and I found that, in actuality, even the Murayama Statement is not sufficiently known in China. And since the impressions produced by Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni ended up overshadowing the contents of his various statements and remarks, I was at first particularly surprised that members on the Chinese side said they wanted to read the full texts of Koizumi's statements and requested copies of them.

It is said that US President Bill Clinton, after reading an English translation of the Murayama Statement, praised it as being a "very courageous statement." From now, more efforts should be made to disseminate this series of statements by Japan's prime ministers more widely overseas.

References
· Kuriyama, Takakazu, Wakai -- Nihon Gaikou no Mondai (1) (Reconciliation -- Issues for Japanese Diplomacy), Gaiko Forum, January 2006.

· Hattori, Ryuji, Murayama Danwa to Gaimushou -- Shuusen 50 Shuunen no Gaikou (The Murayama Statement and MOFA -- Diplomacy in the 50th Year After the End of the War), in Nihonron: Gurobaruka-suru Nihon, ed., Tanaka Tsutomu, Chuo University Press, 2007.

· Shoji, Junichiro, Rekishi-Ninshiki o Meguru Nihon Gaikou -- Nitchuu Kankei o Chuushin To Shite (Japanese Diplomacy Regarding Historical Understanding -- Focusing on Japan-China Relations), Kokusai Seiji, No. 170, October 2012.

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

Arrogant Abe disrespects U.N. and the press

By Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan and APP member

THE JAPAN TIMES, June 10, 2017

What is with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s arrogant disrespect for the United Nations?

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga spread fake news by insisting that the U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres endorsed Japan’s much-maligned “comfort women” deal with South Korea even after his spokesman, Stephane Dujarric, who was in Italy with Guterres when he met Abe, emphatically denied this. The South Korean government reported that it confirmed with Guterres directly that he had not endorsed the deal. Suga’s disinformation may be aimed at discrediting the U.N. Committee Against Torture’s recent call for revisions of the comfort women accord. [See Government of Japan May 12, 2017 rebuttal]

David Kaye, a professor of law at the University of California-Irvine and special rapporteur for the U.N. Human Rights Council, called Abe out on his government’s incivility towards U.N. representatives. Abe is miffed that Kaye and other U.N. representatives have voiced criticisms about the erosion of press freedom and the freedom of expression, in addition to conspiracy legislation that threatens the right to privacy and the right to dissent. These are legitimate concerns widely shared by Japanese about how democratic norms and values are being sacrificed in favor of the surveillance state, and where Abe is leading the nation. [See Kaye 2017 Final report See 2016 Preliminary Observations]

As the Japan Federation of Bar Associations notes, the government is wrong to maintain that the conspiracy legislation is necessary for Japan to live up to its commitments under the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It is also wrong to claim that adopting the conspiracy legislation is necessary for Japan to gain access to intelligence about international terrorism. Scare-mongering about preventing terrorism at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics aims to distract attention away from the ongoing assault on civil liberties. The police already have the powers and laws needed to combat terrorism without handcuffing democracy.

In May, as tens of thousands of demonstrators around the nation decried the Draconian provisions, Joe Cannataci, the U.N. rapporteur on the right to privacy, expressed concerns about the sweeping nature of the powers granted that threaten the right to privacy. Cabinet secretary Suga dismissed Cannataci’s remarks, asserting that he was merely speaking in a private capacity. In fact, he was carrying out his duties. The government also denounced Kaye for doing his job, saying he “degrades the authority of the U.N. Human Rights Council.”

Kaye recently submitted his report on press freedom in Japan to the U.N. Human Rights Council. Kaye has been a target of government criticism since April 2016, when he submitted a scathing draft report that highlighted government intimidation of journalists, self-censorship and the press-club system, all of which enable the government to manage the mainstream news. The government engaged in damage control, arguing that Kaye didn’t meet the right people, didn’t understand the context and failed to give credence to official rebuttals.

At a recent Tokyo symposium sponsored by the Committee to Protect Journalists, Kaye cited the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ Article 19, which protects the people’s right to know. This right is crucial to good governance and accountability, and is why it is essential to protect journalists, because they protect the public by letting them know what the authorities would rather they not know. Citizens’ ability to participate meaningfully in public life and hold government accountable, he argued, rests on the efforts of responsible journalists to access information and promote transparency. In a democracy the media watchdog must be able to bark, and to the extent it is muzzled, citizens’ democratic rights are threatened.

Kaye emphasized that the challenges to a free press are global and the forces of darkness are gathering as governments around the world justify restrictions on civil liberties in terms of combating violent extremism. Terrorism and public safety are typically invoked to muzzle the press, stifle dissent, curb civil liberties, arrest reporters, block access to the internet and adopt draconian surveillance laws.

In his final report, Kaye heralds “a high degree of freedom online,” but expresses concerns about the vaguely worded Specially Designated Secrets Law enacted in 2014, the potential for abuses and how it might impinge on freedom of expression given inadequate protections under the Whistleblower Protection Act. He also lodged a protest with the government after he “became aware of allegations that the government ordered intelligence community members to monitor at last one member of civil society who helped coordinate meetings.” For Kaye it was striking that most of the journalists who confided in him requested anonymity for fear of retaliation by their own management, highlighting the absence of any independent body to protect them from such reprisals.

Japanese journalists, media organizations and civil society groups told Kaye about threats to freedom of expression, including the “opaque and clique-plagued system of press clubs” that enforces norms of “access and exclusion,” self-censorship and access journalism. The latter encourages lapdog reporting to curry favor with those in power.

Kaye draws attention to broadcast regulations, pointing out that they are not independent from the party in power and are thus subject to abuse in ways that intimidate the media. He also reports about the apparent ouster of respected pundits from their broadcasting duties, and the spiking of stories and demotions of reporters as examples of the pressures exerted by the Abe government against its critics. Moreover, he notes allegations that the current political leadership has backed orchestrated campaigns of harassment targeting liberal critics, singling out the Asahi Shimbun in particular.

At the symposium Martin Fackler, former bureau chief of The New York Times in Tokyo, lamented that most Japanese journalists are company employees first, and avoid taking risks, and that media-wide solidarity and commitment to a professional ethos is lacking.

Regarding lapdog journalism, what are we to make of NHK and the Yomiuri helping Abe out over the Kake Gakuen vet school scandal? The Yomiuri’s effort to tarnish the name of Kihei Maekawa, a former top education bureaucrat who alleges Abe did a favor for crony Kotaro Kake, the school’s owner, is unseemly. Reports about Maekawa frequenting singles bars are irrelevant to the testimony Abe is trying to prevent him giving in the Diet on the issue.

Meanwhile, NHK shamelessly sidelined the story, giving short shrift to official papers implicating the prime minister’s office and focusing instead on Princess Mako. Fortunately, other media outlets are making these press poodles look decidedly lame, finally forcing NHK to find its journalistic backbone, at least on this scandal.

Sunday, June 11, 2017

Monday in Washington, June 12, 2017

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION IN “NEW MATERIAL TECHNOLOGIES”. 6/12, 9:00-11:00am. Sponsors: U.S. Department of State; Wiley; Elsevier; Elliott School of International Affairs Institute for International Science and Technology Policy. Speakers: Liang Fang Zhang, Professor, UCSD; Michael Arnold, Professor, UW-Madison; Zhen Gu; Professor, UNC-CH & NCSU.

CHINA’S GREAT GREEN GRID: CAPTURING WASTED WIND AND SOLAR POWER FOR BLUER SKIES AND CLEARER WATERS. 6/12, 9:30-11:30am. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Christopher James, Principal, Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP); Eleanor Stein, Professor, Albany Law School; Mun Ho, Visiting Fellow, Resources for the Future and Senior Associate, Dale Jorgenson Associates.

RELIGION AND VIOLENCE IN RUSSIA. 6/12, 10:30-4:30pm Sponsor: Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS. Speakers: Marlene Laruelle, Professor, International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, GWU; Natalia Yudina, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; Geraldine Fagan, Independent Scholar; Olga Sibireva, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; Alexander Verkhovsky, Director, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis; Jean-François Ratelle, Professor, University of Ottawa; Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Project Director, Russia & North Caucasus, International Crisis Group; Irina Du Quenoy, Independent Scholar; Akhmet Yarlykapov, Senior Research Fellow, Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Sufian Zhemukhov, Senior Research Associate, PONARS Eurasia, GWU.

CLICK TO ORDER
BOOK LAUNCH: THE RIGHT BALANCE FOR BANKS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON OPTIMAL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS. 6/12, Noon-2:00pm, lunch for a select few. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speakers: author William R. Cline (PIIE), Daniel K. Tarullo (former Federal Reserve Governor) and Simon. WEBCAST.

A CONVERSATION WITH MEG GENTLE, PRESIDENT & CEO, TELLURIAN INC. 6/12, Noon-200PM, Lunch. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speaker: CEO Meg Gentle. Moderator: Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Founding Director, Chairman, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT LENDING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC. 6/12, 2:00-3:30pm. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Mireya Solís, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies; Miles Kahler, Distinguished Professor, School of International Service - American University; Victoria Kwakwa, Vice President, East Asia and Pacific Region - The World Bank; Scott Morris, Senior Fellow & Director of the U.S. Development Policy Initiative - Center for Global Development; Hiroyuki Nakashima, Fellow - Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation; Hongying Wang, Associate Professor of Political Science - University of Waterloo. 

CHINA’S VISION FOR A NEW EURASIAN ORDER. 6/12, 3:30-5:00pm. Sponsor: NBR. Speakers: Daniel S. Markey, Senior Research Professor, SAIS, John Hopkins; Ely Ratner, Senior Fellow, CFR; Nadège Rolland, Senior Fellow, NBR; Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Fellow, Carnegie. 

Friday, June 9, 2017

Is this the scandal where the LDP pushes Abe under the bus?



Japanese high-level crony capitalism from schools to the maglev trains that benefits personal friends, and not Abe's district or national voters. This is a change in Japan's political dynamics that could be trouble for the prime minister.